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THE FAILURE OF AVIATION SAFETY IN NEW ZEALAND:
AN EXAMINATION OF NEW ZEALAND'S
IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANNEX 13 OF THE
CHICAGO CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION
SAMANTHA SHARIF*
"It could have happened to any of us."
r[HESE SOBERING words were spoken by Captain Gordon
.LVette after New Zealand's worst air disaster, the Mount Ere-
bus tragedy, where, almost 20 years ago to the day, an Air New
Zealand aircraft flew straight into the side of Mount Erebus in
Antarctica, killing all 257 passengers on board.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEBATE
This paper examines the issue of aviation safety in New Zea-
land. More particularly, this paper analyses New Zealand's im-
plementation of its international obligations under the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation' in relation to the
protection of aviation safety records, and the provisions of the
Transport Accident Investigation Amendment Bill, intended to
implement those obligations. This paper also argues that New
Zealand has thus far failed to effectively promote aviation safety.
* Samatha Sharif is currently Legal Counsel & Company Secretary with
Airways Corporation of New Zealand Limited inWellington, New Zealand, and
was previously General Counsel with Airservices Australia, based in Canberra,
Australia. Samantha has been practising law since 1987, and has practised as a
lawyer in England, Australia, and New Zealand. She has been directly involved in
the aviaiton industry for the last five years. I hope readers of this article will
forgive the fact that, having been written in 1999, it is a little outdated.
Nevertheless, I hope it serves to stimulate consideration of this topic and its
subsequent treatment in New Zealand and other jurisdictions.
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature, Dec.
7, 1944., 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
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In any industry, one of the most valuable tools for the promo-
tion of safety is the ability to learn from previous mistakes. In
the aviation context, this entails effectively analysing any avia-
tion incident or accident and implementing appropriate proce-
dures to minimise the potential for a recurrence. Clearly, the
more information that is available on the circumstances and
causes of an aviation accident, the more comprehensive any sub-
sequent safety analysis is likely to be.
With this aim in mind, a cockpit voice recorder, 2 often collo-
quially referred to as an aircraft's black box, is commonplace in
commercial aircraft worldwide today. The installation of such a
device was driven by a pilot initiative to promote aviation safety
by providing aviation accident investigators with an extremely
useful tool to aid the determination of the circumstances and
causes of an aviation accident, and consequently to devise ap-
propriate safety measures to minimise the potential for a similar
recurrence.
The installation of such potentially intrusive devices was based
on the clear understanding that the records generated would be
used solely for the purposes of aviation safety. This interna-
tional accord has been reflected in the provisions of Annex 13
to the Chicago Convention, which requires that aviation safety
information which is collected for safety purposes can be used
solely for such purposes.' In addition, to prevent the misuse of
information derived from cockpit voice recorders and other
safety information, the International Civil Aviation Organisa-
tion, commonly known as ICAO,' has promulgated a Standard,
requiring signatory states to the Chicago Convention, including
New Zealand, to prevent aviation safety information from being
used for other purposes.4
The utility of aviation safety records is not limited merely to
assisting in determining the circumstances and causes of any
particular aviation accident, but more importantly, such records
are integral to the application of a more fundamental systemic
approach to aviation safety. The requirements of a systemic ap-
proach to aviation safety are outlined below.
2 A cockpit voice recorder is a device that records sounds in a cockpit during at
least the previous 30 minutes of flight, including conversations between the flight
crew and voice communications to and from the aircraft, for example, with air
traffic controllers.
3 Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Annex 13 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation (8th ed. 1994) [hereinafter Annex 13].
4 Id.
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During the past century risk management analysis of inher-
ently hazardous activities has gone through a process of increas-
ing sophistication. Efforts that were initially directed at
addressing operational issues, such as mechanical reliability,
subsequently progressed to identifying and addressing issues re-
lating to human factors, such as human reliability. Over the last
decade the emphasis has evolved to identifying and addressing
organisational factors generating the systemic causes of risk.
Other things being equal, the more complex the industry, the
greater the necessity for an effective systemic analysis.5
Essentially, a systemic analysis requires identification, not
merely of the immediate causes of any accident, but more im-
portantly, a consideration of the culmination of causative events,
referred to as latent failures, which may allow an accident to
occur. A systemic analysis will often trace two or three embed-
ded failures as the root cause of any major accident. Such fail-
ures can manifest as organisational factors, such as decisions by
the board of an organisation, or ultimately government policies.
The traditional legal approach to determining causation, and
thereby legal culpability, essentially relies on establishing proxi-
mate cause,6 such as pilot error. This approach is too unsophis-
ticated to be of any material use in the promotion of aviation
safety.
Two decades ago, the Mahon report on the Mount Erebus
disaster pioneered the application of systemic analysis to the is-
sue of aviation safety.7 In fact, the ICAO has expressed the view
that other high technology disasters such as Chernobyl and Bho-
pal might have been averted if the lessons from Mount Erebus
had been adopted sooner by the international safety
community.
5 Essentially, the more sophisticated the industry, the greater the degree of
interacting networks that are likely to be present. The more interactions that are
present, the greater the potential for error, and the greater the need for systemic
analysis of such networks.
6 As illustrated by the following example, determining legal liability tends to
operate on a domino theory of causation. A caused B which in turn caused C
and D, which caused the accident. D would be the proximate cause. From a
fault perspective, other causes are likely to be considered too remote to be di-
rectly relevant.
7 The Mahon report of the Royal Commission inquired into the crash on
Mount Erebus, Antarctica, of a DC1O aircraft operated by Air New Zealand Lim-
ited. Office of Air Accidents Investigation Report No. 79-139. See Ch. III, The
Mount Erebus Inquiries, infra.
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To date, New Zealand has failed, both legislatively and at com-
mon law, to effectively implement its international obligations
under the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation
with regard to the protection of aviation safety records. Further-
more, despite the recommendations of the Mahon report and
the current Minister of Transport's recent public proclamation
regarding the desirability of such an approach,' New Zealand's
failure to protect such records has thus far failed to create an
environment that will allow for an effective systemic analysis of
aviation risk.' In so doing, the objective of aviation safety has
been compromised."
The remaining Chapters of this paper consider specific as-
pects of the promotion of aviation safety in New Zealand. In
particular, this paper examines the common law and legislative
protections afforded to aviation safety information, and provi-
sions of the Transport Accident Investigation Amendment Bill,
which, at the time of writing, was before the Transport and Envi-
ronment Select Committee. The primary objective of that Bill is
to implement the provisions of the Chicago Convention on avia-
tion safety into New Zealand law.
II. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION
This Chapter examines the provisions of the Chicago Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation that relate to the protection
8 Hon. Maurice Williamson, Minister of Transport, Speech to the Aviation In-
dustry Association Conference, Dunedin (July 30, 1999).
9 This may be partly explained by the application of public choice theory to
this issue, being the application of economics to political science. See generally
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REv. 873 (1987). The basic behavioural postulate of public choice theory is that
organs of government are, in an economic sense, rational utility maximisers. The
government's primary utility maximising goal is re-election. Accordingly, the
government will avoid direct responsibility for any policy decisions which, being
controversial, may prejudice its chances of re-election. In so doing, it may either
simply avoid making such policy decisions, or may abrogate responsibility for
such decisions to another agency. In terms of the implementation of New Zea-
land's obligations under Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, the New Zealand
government has generally avoided making the necessary policy decisions to im-
plement those obligations, and more recently, under the Transport Accident In-
vestigation Amendment Bill discussed in Chapter VI below, has abrogated
responsibility for policy-making to the judiciary. Id. at 878 (citing Dennis Muel-
ler, Public Choice 1 (1979)).
10 This position has changed to some extent since the enactment of the Trans-
port Accident Investigation Commission Amendment Act 1999. See infra Ch. VII.
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of aviation safety information. It then discusses the rationale un-
derlying the internationally expressed desire to protect such in-
formation against disclosure and use for any purpose other than
the promotion of aviation safety.
A. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION: ANNEX 13
All civil aviation matters in New Zealand 1 are based on inter-
national standards and recommended practices set by the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organisation, commonly known as ICAO.
The ICAO was formed by the 1944 Chicago Convention,' 2 to
which New Zealand, along with some 185 other States, is a party.
The main purpose of the Convention was to create a compre-
hensive legal and institutional framework for civil aviation to
"meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular,
efficient and economical air transport.' 13
The Chicago Convention established the legal framework for
international civil aviation by facilitating the removal of domes-
tic legislative barriers to international civil aviation, such as cus-
toms, immigration, and health.' 4 In addition, the Convention
created the framework for the ICAO and its comprehensive leg-
islative processes.15
More specifically, the executive body of ICAO, the ICAO
Council, has legislative power to adopt international standards
it Civil aviation matters include matters such as air space, air traffic control
services, air navigation, and air accident and incident investigation. For the treat-
ment of non-civil aviation matters, see Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. III,
15 U.N.T.S. at 298.
12 Id. art. XLIII, 15 U.N.T.S. at 324.
13 Id. art. XLIV, 15 U.N.T.S. at 326. This also became one of the objectives of
ICAO.
14 Id. art. XLIII, 15 U.N.T.S. at 298.
15 The ICAO creates a Plenary body (the ICAO Assembly) and an Executive
body (the ICAO Council), plus a number of other bodies, including the ICAO
Legal Committee, which has produced the texts for many of the significant avia-
tion treaties adopted since 1944. In addition, the ICAO has proved to be a very
successful mechanism for administering and updating the Chicago Convention
to recent technological developments. See generally id. art. XLIII-LXIII, 15
U.N.T.S. at 324-40. For example, in May 1998, the ICAO convened a global con-
ference relating to the implementation of Satellite Navigation and Air Traffic
Management Systems (CNS/ATM). Whilst such systems could not have been
foreseen by the framers of the Chicago Convention, nevertheless, the Convention
has proved readily adaptable to such recent technologies. See KI. Murray, The
Law Relating to Satellite Navigation and Air Traffic Management Systems - a View from
the South Pacific, The Royal Aeronautical Society CNS/ATM Forum, Sydney (April
1998).
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and recommended practices regarding civil aviation. This
power provides the primary mechanism by which minimum and
uniform aviation safety and other standards are promulgated for
international civil aviation. Such adopted standards and recom-
mended practices, generally known as SARPS, become Annexes
to the Convention that are then forwarded to Contracting
States. Contracting States are then bound to "collaborate in se-
curing the highest practicable degree of uniformity" in imple-
menting the adopted standards and recommended practices. 6
There are currently eighteen Annexes to the Convention, cover-
ing a wide range of matters of technical detail.
Clearly, the Chicago Convention recognises the paramount
importance of cockpit voice records when conducting compre-
hensive aviation safety analyses. Accordingly, Annex 13 recom-
mends the universal installation and use of relevant cockpit
voice recorders and similar devices.17 However, as a corollary to
this, Annex 13 also reflects the international accord that the in-
formation derived from cockpit voice recorders, and other in-
formation recorded for the purpose of aviation safety, should
only be used for the purposes of aviation safety.' 8 To this end,
Annex 13 also codifies the standards and recommended prac-
tices adopted by the ICAO for aircraft accident and incident
safety investigations.' 9
To minimise the potential misuse of such aviation safety infor-
mation, Annex 13 expressly requires signatory States to prevent
aviation safety information from being used for other non-safety
purposes.2 0 More specifically, Annex 13 prevents this informa-
16 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. XXXVII, 15 U.N.T.S. at 320. Where
such Annexes contain international standards they become binding on Con-
tracting States 60 days after adoption by the ICAO Council, unless, within that
period any contracting State has notified a difference, that is, any departure,
from any non-mandatory Annex provisions. Chicago Convention, supra note 1,
art. XII, 15 U.N.T.S. at 304. Note that contracting States cannot notify any differ-
ences with respect to certain standards declared mandatory pursuant to Art. 12,
such as the Rules of the Airin Annex 2. See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, LAw-MAKING IN
THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION (1969).
17 Annex 13, supra note 3, at para. 5.7.
IS Id. at para. 5.12.
19 Annex 13 constitutes a comprehensive code which has been amended on a
number of occasions. Annex 13, supra note 4, at vii. Earlier versions of Annex 13
only applied to aviation accidents having an international aspect. However,
whilst this is not expressly stated in the document, the view taken by the ICAO is
that the current eighth edition of Annex 13 (July 1994), applies to domestic acci-
dents as well.
20 Id. at para. 5.12.
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tion from being used as evidence in proceedings against aviation
professionals. 21 The key provision in this regard is paragraph
5.12 of Annex 13, which provides as follows:
The State conducting the investigation of an accident or inci-
dent, wherever it occurred, shall not make the following records
available for purposes other than accident or incident investiga-
tion, unless the appropriate authority for the administration of
justice in that State determines that their disclosure outweighs
the adverse domestic and international impact such action may
have on that or any future investigations:
a) all statements taken from persons by the investigation author-
ities in the course of their investigation;
b) all communications between persons having been involved in
the operation of the aircraft;
c) medical or private information regarding persons involved in
the accident or incident;
d) cockpit recordings and transcripts from such recordings; and
e) opinions expressed in the analysis of information, including
flight recorder information.2 2
Whilst Annex 13 allows for disclosure in limited circum-
stances, such an occurrence is extremely unlikely. Aviation
safety information may only be disclosed for non-safety purposes
when disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic and interna-
tional impact that disclosure will have on aviation safety. In real-
ity, any interests that may exist in the disclosure of aviation safety
information for opposing prosecutory purposes will always be
outweighed by the resulting adverse impact on aviation safety.
B. THE USES OF AVIATION SAFETY INFORMATION
The international aviation community commonly accepts that
whenever information recorded for safety purposes is disclosed
for other purposes, it will have some adverse effect on safety be-
cause the disclosure will prejudice the continuous flow of such
essential safety information in the future. Aviation professionals
will naturally be reluctant to engage in free and frank communi-
cations when so doing may result in such communications being
used to incriminate them. Facing incrimination, aviation pro-
21 Id. at paras. 3.1, 5A2.
22 Id. at para. 5.12. Immediately following paragraph 5.12 is an explanatory
note in these terms: "These records shall be included in the final report or its
appendices only when pertinent to the analysis of the accident or incident. Parts
of the records not relevant to the analysis shall not be disclosed." Id.
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fessionals would instead invoke the common law privilege
against self-incrimination.
Furthermore, even if such communications are made compul-
sory, it is unlikely to prevent the rational response of aviation
professionals of adjusting their communications to a minimum.
Consequently, it is accepted internationally that, in this context,
the public interest in the pursuit of aviation safety and the pub-
lic interest in the pursuit of individual legal liability cannot eas-
ily be reconciled. In order to carry out the test set out in
paragraph 5.12 of Annex 13, and determine whether aviation
safety information should be made available for other conflict-
ing purposes, the relative public interest in the conflicting
objectives of aviation safety and aviation proceedings must be
compared. This comparison will help to determine which objec-
tive bears the greater public interest and should prevail.
C. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN AVIATION SAFETY AND
AVIATION PROSECUTIONS
The effective promotion of aviation safety requires the appli-
cation of systemic analysis to identify all of the factors contribut-
ing to the risk of an aviation incident or accident. Such systemic
analysis recognises the inherent limitations of determining cau-
sation under a traditional legal approach. Traditional legal
analysis is generally confined to identifying the proximate cause
of an event, and thus dismisses other causes as legally too
remote.
Whilst the argument is sometimes mounted that the sanction
of criminal or civil prosecution will encourage increased compli-
ance by aviation professionals, thereby enhancing aviation
safety, this is, at best, questionable. In fact, such an argument is
a manifestation of what has been described as "the fallacy of the
perfectibility approach. ''23 The threat of prosecution cannot
prevent human error. Moreover, it would seem that the threat
of almost certain death, for the aviators and their passengers
should they fail, would be a far greater encouragement to com-
pliance. Further, if the ultimate objective of prosecution is to
enhance aviation safety, then the pursuit of criminal or civil
prosecution will fail to achieve this. Such prosecutions are out-
come-based; that is, they punish an outcome, regardless of the
23 David Marx, Address before the Aviation Law Association of Australia & New
Zealand Limited, New Zealand Branch, Wellington (Oct. 7, 1999).
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degree of culpability of the person who physically produced that
outcome.24
The majority of aviation incidents and accidents are not
caused by intentional non-compliance by aviation professionals.
The occasions on which a pilot might be considered to have de-
liberately crashed an aircraft are extremely rare. Rather, in a
highly complex industry such as aviation, such incidents and ac-
cidents are more likely to be attributable to a complex culmina-
tion of systemic factors, with the pilot merely being the last
causative link in the chain.
If prosecution is intended to promote aviation safety, then it
should be directed at addressing low reliability and other
human factors relevant to systemic risk analysis. As prosecution
is not aimed at addressing such factors, it has little role in the
pursuit of aviation safety.
Not only is the threat of prosecution of questionable efficacy
as a promoter of aviation safety, it is also rarely likely to be exer-
cised. An intentional offense on the part of aviation profession-
als is extremely rare. Further, those who might potentially have
attracted any degree of traditional legal liability will often have
perished.
Moreover, public interest is more concerned with advancing
safety than in punishing error. Proceedings to determine culpa-
bility for a specific aviation incident or accident impacts the few
people concerned, such as the pilot and flight crew. Preventing
that aviation incident or accident from occurring affects all of
the persons carried on the relevant aircraft, if not the aviation
public more generally. To state the issue from a law and eco-
nomics perspective, the public interest in securing any individ-
ual prosecution through the use of aviation safety information is
outweighed by the greater public good of safer air transport. In
the words of a former air accident investigator, "I suspect if you
gave an air traveler the choice of a better chance to arrive safely
at the other end, or the chance to pillory the pilot should he not
arrive, the answer would favour improved safety.
25
Whilst, clearly, the public interest in the pursuit of aviation
prosecutions also involves the wider public interest in securing
24 For example, under § 44 of the Civil Aviation Act 1990, no intent element is
required for the offence.
25 Dmitri Zotov, We Need More Aviation Safety, Not More Lawsuits, THE INDEPEN-
DENT, Aug. 4, 1999. Mr. Zotov is the former Inspector of Air Accidents with the
Office of Air Accidents Investigation.
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the proper administration of justice, this wider public interest
does not need to be taken into account in balancing the rele-
vant interests of aviation safety and aviation prosecutions in ac-
cordance with paragraph 5.12. This is because in determining
that the public interest in aviation prosecutions is outweighed by
the public interest in aviation safety, it is not being suggested
that the public interest in securing the proper administration ofjustice should be compromised, just as it is not suggested that
aviation professionals should have immunity from criminal or
civil proceedings.
The rationale expressed in Annex 13, that information re-
corded for the purposes of aviation safety should only be used
for those purposes, does not require that any aviation profes-
sional should have immunity from proceedings. What is re-
quired is that any aviation communication which is mandatorily,
or by agreement, recorded for the purpose of promoting safety
in aviation should not then be available by way of collateral ad-
vantage to a prosecutory agency for other conflicting purposes.
Whilst it is accepted that the contents of such aviation safety
records will often provide the most conclusive source of evi-
dence, this is not an inherent reason to make such information
available to prosecuting agencies. Accordingly, if a prosecutory
agency wishes to establish criminal or civil responsibility on the
part of any aviation professional, that agency should have to pro-
ceed in the same way as it would in all other cases where such
information is not automatically recorded.
Whilst the opinion of the international aviation community as
expressed in Annex 13, that the public interest in the pursuit of
aviation safety and the public interest in the pursuit of aviation
prosecutions cannot be reconciled, can be questioned, in doing
so, a convincing alternative should be given. That is, the point
at which the objective of aviation safety can be reconciled with
the objective of aviation prosecutions should be clearly
identified.
It is sometimes argued that since New Zealand has filed a noti-
fication of non-compliance with paragraph 5.12 of Annex 13,26
it therefore should not be considered bound by its international
26 In 1982, New Zealand filed a notification of non-compliance with paragraph
5.12 of Annex 13 to the ICAO stating that: "No absolute guarantee can be given
that the records listed in paragraph 5.12 will not be disclosed. All practical steps
will be taken, however, to minimise the extent and occurrence of such disclo-
sures." For this procedure, see Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. XXXVIII,
15 U.N.T.S. at 322.
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obligations to collaborate in securing the highest practicable de-
gree of uniformity in relation to protecting aviation safety infor-
mation. But the reasons behind the filing of this notification
are entirely unconnected with the issue of access to aviation
safety information.27 Moreover, as a signatory and party to the
Chicago Convention, New Zealand should not lightly disregard
the opinions of the international aviation community expressed
therein or its obligations thereunder. New Zealand should
faithfully reflect the purposes and provisions of Annex 13 to the
Convention by protecting aviation safety information in its do-
mestic law, unless there are compelling reasons for departure.
III. COMMON LAW APPLICATION OF THE CHICAGO
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION IN NEW ZEALAND
At common law, New Zealand has consistently been unwilling
to recognise and implement its obligations under Annex 13,
and correspondingly unwilling to recognise the necessity for af-
fording comprehensive protections for aviation safety informa-
tion against disclosure and use for other purposes.
Furthermore, despite the recommendations of the Mahon re-
port and the current Minister of Transport publicly proclaiming
the desirability of such an approach,28 New Zealand's failure to
adequately protect such records has thus far prohibited the cre-
ation of an environment that will allow for an effective systemic
analysis to the issue of aviation risk. In so doing, the primary
objective of aviation safety underlying Annex 13 to the Chicago
Convention has been compromised.
A. THE JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE
The Mount Erebus Inquiries
The first significant common law decision in which these is-
sues were considered is not, in fact, a decision by ajudicial tribu-
nal, but a decision from the Office of the Ombudsmen. The
27 The reason for the filing of the notification is that when the Official Infor-
mation Act was passed, the Crown Law Office advised the then Office of Air Acci-
dents Investigation that the previous policy guaranteeing witness anonymity was
now uncertain. This made it likely that any demand under the Official Informa-
tion Act for access to witness statements would be upheld. Accordingly, as the
protection of witness statements was no longer possible, the notification had to
be filed.
28 Hon. Maurice Williamson, Minister of Transport, Speech to the Aviation In-
dustry Association Conference, Dunedin (July 30, 1999).
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Office of the Ombudsmen concluded that there was no reason
to prevent aviation safety information, in the form of cockpit
voice records, from being made available for proceedings.29
The Mount Erebus decision revolved around the unfortunate
circumstances of New Zealand's worst air disaster, where an Air
New Zealand DC1O aircraft flew straight into the lower slopes of
Mount Erebus in Antarctica on November 28, 1979, killing all
257 people on board. Understandably, this tragedy generated a
great deal of compelling controversy. The discussion below,
however, is confined to an analysis of the issues relating to the
status of the aviation safety information relevant to this
accident. °
Post-accident, the New Zealand Office of Air Accidents Inves-
tigation3 carried out a standard investigation into the causes of
the accident pursuant to the aviation accidents legislation in
force at the time.3 2 That legislation expressly gave effect to An-
nex 13 of the Chicago Convention and thus, clearly reiterated
the rationale of the international aviation community that, in
order to effectively promote aviation safety information re-
corded for the purposes of aviation safety should only be used
for such purposes. "[T]he main purpose of accident investiga-
tions is to determine the circumstances and causes of the acci-
dents with a view to avoiding accidents in the future, rather than
to assign blame or liability to any person. '33
After completing its investigation, the Office of Air Accidents
Investigation published a detailed and authoritative official acci-
dent report that comprehensively analysed, not only the imme-
diate causes of the accident, but also more importantly, the
systemic failures surrounding the accident. 4
Due to the scale of the tragedy, the Government later decided
that it would be in the public interest to hold a Royal Commis-
29 Whilst the Ombudsmen's decisions are not legally binding on either the
Ombudsmen's Office itself or any other tribunal, its decisions are published, and
are persuasive. Certainly, the Ombudsman's decision in this case received an
inordinate degree of public and media focus and debate due to the controversy
of the issues, and the extraordinary circumstances involved.
3o For a detailed analysis of all the circumstances relevant to the accident, see
the Report of the Royal Commission to inquire into the crash on Mount Erebus,
Antarctica, of a DC1O aircraft operated by Air New Zealand Limited 1981.
31 The predecessor to the Transport Accident Ivnestigation Commission.
32 The Civil Aviation Act 1964 and The Civil Aviation (Accident Investigaton)
Regulations 1978.
33 The Civil Aviation (Accident Investigation) Regulations 1978, at reg. 5.
34 Office of Air Accidents Investigation Report No. 79-139.
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sion of Inquiry into the accident. However, the Royal Commis-
sion was given far wider terms of reference than those that
applied to the Office of Air Accidents Investigation. In particu-
lar, those terms of reference did not repeat the purposive state-
ment contained in the relevant accident investigation
legislation, but by contrast, clearly implied that an investigation
into culpability was expected.3 5 Controversially, the Royal Com-
mission's final report substantially disagreed with the conclu-
sions of the Office of Air Accidents Investigation regarding its
interpretation of the cockpit voice recorder tapes and the mean-
ings to be derived therefrom. This again highlights the issue
that the analysis of aviation safety information necessarily in-
volves a degree of subjective interpretation that will be influ-
enced by the particular aims of the interpreter.
The impact and status of the Royal Commission's report on
the Office of Air Accidents Investigation official accident report
remains unclear. This is partly attributable to the fact that the
Royal Commission's report had, until very recently, never been
officially recognised by tabling in Parliament.
36
Nevertheless, it is clear that in requiring the Royal Commis-
sion to carry out an aviation accident inquiry, where one of the
main purposes of that inquiry was to determine culpability, the
New Zealand Government was prepared to disregard and under-
mine New Zealand's international obligations with respect to
the purposes and use of aviation safety information as expressed
in Annex 13. Furthermore, New Zealand was prepared to take
35 In particular, the Commission's terms of reference required the Commis-
sioner to inquire and report inter alia upon:
(g) Whether the crash of the aircraft or the death of the passengers
and crew was caused or contributed to by any person (whether or
not that person was on board the aircraft) by an act or omission in
respect of any function in relation to the operation, maintenance,
servicing, flying, navigation, maneuvering, or air traffic control of
the aircraft, being a function which that person had a duty to per-
form or which good aviation practice required that person to
perform?
Paragraph (i) of the terms of reference also required the Royal Commission to
inquire and report on "the existing laws and procedures relating to (i) the inves-
tigation of accidents and (ii) the making available to interested persons of infor-
mation obtained during the investigating of air accidents." The Royal
Commission, however, only made very brief comments in response to this term of
reference.
36 The current Minister of Transport had recently indicated an intention to
table the Mahon report in November 1999, on the 20th anniversary of the publi-
cation of the report, although the writer understands that the report was actually
tabled prior to this date.
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such action even though its international obligations had been
incorporated, at least in part, into domestic legislation.
A similar disregard for New Zealand's domestic3 7 and interna-
tional38 obligations relating to aviation safety information was ev-
idenced by the Ombudsman requesting access to the cockpit
voice recorder tape. After the accident, the Office of Air Acci-
dents Investigation received a request under the Official Infor-
mation Act of 1982 for access to the cockpit voice recorder tape
from the aircraft for the purposes of civil litigation. As would be
expected, the Office of Air Accidents Investigation declined to
provide access to the tape for prosecutory purposes on the
grounds of New Zealand's international obligations. The Office
also argued that making the information available for such pur-
poses would prejudice the future supply of such information,
and that it was in the public interest that such information con-
tinue to be supplied.3 9
The decision not to allow the cockpit voice recorder informa-
tion to be made available for prosecutory purposes was appealed
to the Ombudsman. The use of cockpit voice recorder informa-
tion was, and until very recently remained, governed primarily
by the terms of the relevant employment contract; as such, the
Ombudsman consulted with the relevant party to that contract,
the New Zealand Airline Pilots' Association (NZALPA), regard-
ing the release of this information. The union's view was that
the installation of potentially intrusive devices such as cockpit
voice recorders was based on the clear understanding that the
records generated would be used solely for the purposes of avia-
tion safety. Consequently, in their view, to allow the cockpit
voice recorder tape to be made available for a prosecution
would lead to justified industrial action and the disabling of
cockpit voice recorders.40
Despite such strong representations, the Ombudsman did not
think that there was a significant possibility that the future use
37 Pursuant to both the Civil Aviation (Accident Investigation) Regulations
1978 and the collective employment contract between NZALPA and Air New
Zealand.
38 Pursuant to Annex 13, supra note 3.
39 Section 9(2) (ba) of the Official Information Act provides that information
may be withheld "where the making available of the information would be likely
to prejudice the supply of similar information . . . and it is in the public interest
that such information should continue to be supplied.., or would be likely other-
wise to damage the public interest." Official Information Act § 9(2) (ba) (1982).
40 Similar views were expressed in Australian Nat'l Airlines Comm'n v. Common-
wealth, (1975) 132 CLR 582, 584. See Chap. VIII, infra.
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of cockpit voice recorders would be prejudiced, and the cockpit
voice recorder tape was made available for the civil
proceedings.41
In so doing, the Ombudsman chose to ignore the generally
held view of the international aviation community that when-
ever information recorded for safety purposes could be dis-
closed for other purposes, it would adversely affect safety by
prejudicing the continuous flow of such essential safety informa-
tion in the future. Accordingly, as the greater public interest in
the pursuit of aviation safety outweighs the public interest in the
pursuit of prosecution, such information should not be made
available for prosecutory purposes.
The Ansett Dash 8 Accident
The most significant recent case to consider the application
of Annex 13 in New Zealand, and the protections afforded to
aviation safety information under New Zealand law, involved the
crash of an Ansett Dash 8, just outside Palmerston North, in
June 1995. This accident brought the issues surrounding the
protection of aviation safety information in New Zealand into
sharp and controversial focus.
In this accident the cabin attendant and three passengers
died and a number of the other 17 passengers suffered serious
injuries when the crew, distracted by faulty landing gear, al-
lowed the aircraft to continue a descent that resulted in it im-
pacting hilly terrain some 16 kilometres from the airport.4 2
Post-accident, the Transport Accident Investigation Commis-
sion4" carried out an investigation into the causes of the acci-
dent pursuant to the Transport Accident Investigation
Commission Act. This legislation replaces the Civil Aviation Act
of 1964 referred to above, and similarly gives express effect to
Annex 13 and reiterates the rationale of the international avia-
tion community, as expressed in Annex 13 and in the previous
legislation, that in order effectively to promote aviation safety,
information recorded for the purposes of aviation safety should
only be used for such purposes.
41 The Ombudsman's preliminary ruling was set out in a detailed letter to the
Secretary for Transport dated 27 November 1987.
42 The accident was subject to a very detailed investigation by the Transport
Accident Investigation Commission, which resulted in an undated official acci-
dent report No. 95-011.
43 The successor to the Office of Air Accidents Investigation.
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After the accident, the Transport Accident Investigation Com-
mission received a request for access to the cockpit voice re-
corder tape for the purposes of litigation. On this occasion,
however, the litigation contemplated was a criminal prosecu-
tion, and the tape was sought, not specifically under the Official
Information Act of 1982, but by way of a search warrant ob-
tained by the police.44 As would be expected, the Transport Ac-
cident Investigation Commission similarly relied on the Official
Information Act and declined to provide access to the tape for
prosecutory purposes on the grounds of New Zealand's interna-
tional obligations and that to make the information available for
such purposes would prejudice the future supply of such infor-
mation. Just as the Office of Air Accidents Investigation before
them, the Transport Accident Investigation Commission felt
that it was in the public interest that such information should
continue to be supplied.45
The decision not to allow the cockpit voice recorder informa-
tion to be made available for prosecutory purposes was taken to
the High Court and later to the Court of Appeal.46 During the
High Court stage of the proceedings, Justice Panckhurst 47 de-
voted considerable time to reviewing the potential relevance of
New Zealand's international obligations under Annex 13 with
regard to the protection and uses of aviation safety information.
His Honour noted that there were a number of instances where
international instruments had been considered directly applica-
ble to New Zealand law without the need for express incorpora-
tion. However, His Honour took the view that such direct
applicability could generally only relate to considerations of fun-
damental human rights, which did not apply to the obligations
44 The Police sought access to the cockpit voice recorder by search warrant for
the purpose of obtaining evidence for possible criminal charges against the flight
crew.
45 Section 9(2) (ba) of the Official Information Act provides that information
may be withheld "where the making available of the information would be likely
to prejudice the supply of similar information ... and it is in the public interest
that such information should continue to be supplied . . . or would be likely
otherwise to damage the public interest." Official Information Act § 9(2) (ba)
(1982).
46 Substantial civil proceedings, for example, against the undercarriage and
GPWS system manufacturers commenced after the accident. However, such
claims have almost entirely been struck out as barred by New Zealand's no-fault
accident compensation legislation. See McGrory v. Ansett New Zealand (Unreported
Judgment of Smellie, J., Dec. 11, 1997, Auckland Registry CP 228/97).
47 Unreported Judgment of Panckhurst, J., Wellington Registry CP 164/96
(Dec. 18, 1996).
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in Annex 13. Given that Annex 13 essentially enshrines the well-
established fundamental right of the privilege against self-in-
crimination, it is respectfully submitted that this conclusion is
perhaps debatable.
In fact, Justice Panckhurst seems to question this conclusion
himself later in the judgment, where he states that, despite the
conclusion that Annex 13 does not form part of New Zealand
law, in considering whether to allow seizure of aviation safety
information by way of search warrant for use in potential crimi-
nal proceedings, regard must be given to New Zealand's interna-
tional obligations. Further, the test to be used to determine
whether seizure of such information should be allowed was that
set out in Annex 13, namely, whether the need for a search war-
rant "outweighed the adverse domestic and international impact
such action may have on that or any future investigations. '48
However, the suggestion that Annex 13 might be relevant to
determining whether aviation safety information should be
available for prosecutory purposes in New Zealand law was em-
phatically rejected by the Court of Appeal.49 After considering
the means by which international instruments could be incorpo-
rated into domestic law, the conclusion was reached that:
The broad point is that some of the provisions of the Convention
and Annexes are appropriate in their subject-matter and drafting
for direct application in the law of New Zealand, others require
detailed national legislation, while still others do not call for na-
tional legislation at all .. .The conclusion is clear: the Chicago
Convention as a whole does not form part of the law of New
Zealand.5 °
Further, after rejecting any direct applicability for the provi-
sions of Annex 13 itself, the Court of Appeal was also unwilling
to entertain the notion that analogous protections for aviation
safety information might be available under the common law.
This attitude was evidenced by the court's statement:
[T]his Court in developing the law of public interest immunity
over the last 35 years has increasingly emphasised the need to
examine closely the issues and ambience of the particular case in
order to decide if there is good reason to uphold the objection to
release .. .Parliament has manifested a similar reluctance to
4 Annex 13, supra note 3, at para. 5.12.
49 New Zealand Airline Pilots' Ass'n v. Att'y-Gen. [1997] 3 N.Z.L.R. 269.
50 Id. at 285 (citing Law Commission, A New Zealand Guide to International Law
and its Sources, NZLC R34 1996, at ch. 2).
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recognise a class approach in the Official Information Act
1982.51
It is submitted that New Zealand's reluctance to protect avia-
tion safety information either by way of direct applicability or by
the application of analogous common law protections is mis-
guided. The conclusion that Annex 13 should not be of direct
applicability is debatable. Further, the mischief at which the
erosion of common law principles such as class public interest
immunity is aimed, and the sentiment behind the passage of the
Official Information Act 1982, is to increase the availability of
official information in order to encourage participation by the
electorate in governmental decision-making, and to promote ex-
ecutive and bureaucratic accountability.
Increasing the availability of aviation safety information to
parties with interests opposed to the enhancement of aviation
safety is unlikely to have any direct impact on the promotion of
accountability and participation by the electorate in governmen-
tal policy processes. Further, given that the public interest in
securing any individual prosecution is overridden by the greater
public interest in encouraging full and frank communications in
order to preserve and promote the integrity of the aviation sys-
tem, it is submitted that common law protections should apply
to protect aviation safety information.52
The decisions discussed above clearly show that, at common
law New Zealand has consistently disregarded and undermined
its domestic53 and international5 4 obligations governing the pur-
poses and use of aviation safety information. New Zealand has
proved correspondingly unwilling to recognise the necessity for
51 Id. at 292-93 (citing Brightwell v. Accident Comp. Corp. [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 132,
139). In Australia, a class claim to protect official documents was not upheld in
the criminal case of Sankey v. Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1. Until recently, the
United Kingdom has been more prepared to allow claims on a class basis. See Air
Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 A.C. 394. However, on December 18,
1996, the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General advised Parliament that in
the future, class claims would not be made and public interest immunity would
only be claimed if a particular document would cause "real damage or harm." See
Shawcross & Beaumont Air Law, ch. VI, at para. 65, note.
52 A recent case in which a public interest immunity argument was successful is
the Australian case of Rogers v. Jacobsen (1995) 61 F.C.R. 57. In that case, public
interest immunity was granted because the court believed that the grant of a
search warrant would prejudice cooperation between an industry and a regula-
tory agency.
53 Pursuant to legislative and employment contract obligations.
54 Pursuant to Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention.
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affording comprehensive protections against the disclosure and
use of aviation safety information for non-safety purposes.
B. OTHER COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVES
This section examines whether aviation safety information
may be afforded protection against disclosure and use for pur-
poses other than the promotion of aviation safety under other
provisions of the common law.
Employment Law
The introduction of cockpit voice recorders in New Zealand
was driven by a pilot initiative to promote aviation safety. The
installation of such potentially intrusive devices was based on the
clear understanding, as reflected in the Chicago Convention,
that aviation safety information recorded for such purposes
would be used solely for such purposes. This intention is fur-
ther reflected in relevant employment contracts relating to the
use of aviation safety information. These contracts state that
such information is only to be used for safety purposes. 55
Consequently, the collective view expressed by the providers
of aviation safety information is that the use of such information
for other purposes would be a clear breach of such employment
contracts and international agreements protecting the use of
aviation safety information, which would likely lead to justified
industrial action and the disabling of aviation safety recording
devices.5 6 If this were to occur, it would clearly prejudice the
continued supply of essential aviation safety information.
Accordingly, in the absence of express legislation compelling
the disclosure of aviation safety information for prosecutory pur-
poses, or any clear public policy considerations 57 that might pre-
clude the enforcement of the relevant employment contract
provisions, it is surprising and inequitable that New Zealand has
been prepared to permit the disclosure and use of aviation
55 See, for example, clause 75 of the Air Traffic Controllers' Collective Employ-
ment Contract with Airways Corporation of New Zealand Limited.
56 Similar views were expressed by the New Zealand Airline Pilots' Association
during the Mount Erebus Inquiries, supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text, and
the Australian National Airlines case, supra note 40. The Austrailan National Airlines
case is also discussed infra, Ch. VIII.
57 Whilst it would generally be against public policy for such agreements to
attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the courts, immunity from proceedings before
the courts, or any other tribunal, is not intended by such provisions.
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safety information for conflicting prosecutory purposes.58 In so
doing, the courts and other tribunals have apparently disre-
garded the express terms of the voluntary agreements that gov-
ern the recording and use of such information, thus
jeopardizing the continued supply of such essential aviation
safety information to the international aviation community.
Common Law Principles
Privilege
The public interest in the proper administration ofjustice re-
quires that all information which may be relevant to the conduct
of litigation be disclosed to each party prior to the proceedings
through the discovery process. However, certain exceptions to
this general principle exist. In particular, an exception exists
when the public interest in full disclosure is outweighed by a
greater public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of par-
ticular communications. Such exceptions to the general princi-
ple of availability fall under two main headings, namely, the
common law principles of privilege and public interest
immunity.
The common law principle of privilege comprises the legal
professional privilege and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The legal professional privilege is based on the premise
that the public interest in full pre-trial disclosure is outweighed
by the greater public interest in encouraging full and frank com-
munications to legal advisors to promote the greater public
good of preserving and promoting the integrity of the justice
system. The privilege against self-incrimination, on the other
hand, is based on the premise that the public interest in full pre-
trial disclosure is outweighed by the greater public interest in
not compelling a person to give evidence which might incrimi-
nate that person.59
The decisions discussed above appear to disregard the poten-
tial application of the privilege against self-incrimination as it
applies to the issue of release of aviation safety information.
However, the courts have also refused to permit an airline em-
58 See The Mount Erebus Inquiries, supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
59 Note that this privilege only applies in the context of criminal proceedings.
This right has also been incorporated into the 1990 New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act, which states that anyone charged with an offence has the right "not to be
compelled to be a witness or to confess guilt." New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
§ 25 (1990) (emphasis added).
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ployer to use its proprietary cockpit voice records60 as the basis
for any potential disciplinary action against its own staff mem-
bers. These decisions are apparently based on the presence of
the privilege against self-incrimination. 61 In fact, somewhat per-
versely, the courts have seemingly adopted an expansionist ap-
proach in applying the doctrine in this context. For example, in
the context of the Ansett Dash 8 accident, the employer airline
was estopped from using its cockpit voice records, not only until
the Transport Accident Investigation Commission report into
the accident was published and the ensuing civil litigation was
concluded, 62 but also until any potential criminal prosecutions
were completed, including any appeal processes. The police,
however, had already obtained access to the cockpit voice re-
corder, and were therefore capable of making an independent
assessment of whether sufficient evidence of culpability existed.
As a result, the individuals concerned have remained suspended
from duties, on full pay by their employer, for over three years,
with no likely conclusion of this matter in sight.63
Given that the private interest in securing any individual pros-
ecution is outweighed by the greater public interest in encour-
aging full and frank communications in order to create an
environment which will allow for a systemic analysis of aviation
risk, it is submitted that the privilege against self-incrimination
should, in principle, apply to aviation safety information.
Public Interest Immunity
Similar to the common law principles of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the common law principle of public interest
immunity is based on the premise that the public interest in full
pre-trial disclosure is outweighed by the greater public interest
60 Although ownership of cockpit voice recorders can be a complex legal issue,
it is generally accepted that the aircraft owner or current operator owns the cock-
pit voice recorder records.
61 An injunction was granted against the employer because the right to silence
in a police investigation would be undermined if evidence given in the discipli-
nary process was able to be accessed by the police.
62 The airline employer, Ansett New Zealand Limited, actually agreed not to
institute any disciplinary proceedings until the Transport Accident Investigation
report was finalised, and then again agreed to defer disciplinary action until the
civil litigation was concluded.
63 Peter Cullen, Staff Discipline Called Off Until Criminal Charges Resolved, Em-
ployment Matters, THE DOMINION (2d ed.) June 16, 1999.
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in preserving the confidentiality of particular information.64
There are two categories of public interest immunity: class im-
munity and contents immunity. The class immunity principle
applies public interest immunity to information within a defined
class, such as Cabinet documents. 65 The contents immunity
principle applies public interest immunity to specific informa-
tion, rather than information within a general class. The scope
of both class and contents immunity has significantly eroded
over the last decade, essentially due to a paradigm shift away
from secrecy and towards increasing transparency in central gov-
ernment policy processes.
The erosion of the public interest immunity interlocutory de-
fence is aimed to encourage participation by the electorate in
governmental decision-making and to promote bureaucratic
and executive accountability. This is also the sentiment behind
the passage of the Official Information Act.
Clearly, increasing the availability of aviation safety informa-
tion to parties with interests opposed to the enhancement of
aviation safety is -unlikely to have any direct impact on the pro-
motion of executive and bureaucratic accountability and partici-
pation by the electorate in governmental policy processes.
Further, given that it is commonly accepted internationally that
the public interest in securing any individual prosecution is out-
weighed by the greater public interest in encouraging full and
frank communications between aviation professionals to create
an environment that allows for a systemic analysis of aviation
risk, it is submitted that class and contents public interest immu-
nity should, in principle, apply to aviation safety information.
The ftindamental principle of the Chicago Convention pro-
vides that all aviation safety information should be inherently
protected as a class to promote the integrity of the international
aviation system. Whilst contents public interest immunity may
remain available for certain aviation safety information on the
basis of an analysis of the specific aviation information con-
tained in a specific record, it is submitted that adopting such an
approach undermines that principle. Consequently, the con-
tents of any particular aviation safety record are irrelevant. To
64 In relation to the application of the doctrine of public interest immunity,
see Ex parte Wiley [1994] 1 A.C. 274. In this case before the House of Lords in
Britain, Lord Woolf identified several general principles regarding the applica-
tion of the doctrine.
65 The class immunity defence is also possibly available to a limited extent
under statute. Supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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permit the examination of any particular aviation record to de-
termine whether confidentiality should apply completely under-
mines that fundamental principle.
Accordingly, it is suggested that the recent New Zealand pro-
nouncements on this topic which preclude the availability of
class, and possibly also contents, public interest immunity for
cockpit voice records and other aviation safety information, are
perhaps misguided.., Such decisions have failed to appreciate
that the fundamental rationale underlying the general erosion
of the public interest immunity defence does not apply in the
context of the protection of aviation safety information.66
By contrast, more recent decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsmen have accepted the legitimacy of applying public in-
terest immunity on a class basis to aviation safety information.6 7
For example, earlier this year the Office of the Ombudsmen ac-
cepted that the public interest in ensuring the future availability
of aviation safety information required that such information be
protected as a class. This current approach of the Office of the
Ombudsmen regarding the application of public interest immu-
nity, although unlikely currently to be supported by the New
Zealand courts, is the correct one.
IV. LEGISLATIVE APPLICATION OF THE CHICAGO
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION IN NEW ZEALAND
This Chapter considers the legislative effect in New Zealand
of the relevant provisions of Annex 13 to the Chicago Conven-
tion and the protections afforded to aviation safety information.
Aviation specific statutes are considered first, and then relevant
generic legislation.
66 A recent case in which a public interest immunity argument was successful is
the Australian case of Rogers v. Jacobsen (1995) 61 F.C.R. 57. In that case, public
interest immunity was granted because the grant of a search warrant would
prejudice cooperation between an industry and a regulatory agency.
67 Interestingly, the Official Information Act of 1982 expressly excludes the
availability of public interest immunity in some instances. For example, the im-
munity is excluded when refusing to answer any question in relation to any
Ombudsman investigation or a statutory judicial review.
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A. AvIATION SPECIFIC LEGISLATION
Civil Aviation Act 1990
All air traffic services within New Zealand airspace are gov-
erned by the Civil Aviation Act 1990, which is administered by
the Civil Aviation Authority. This government agency is ac-
countable to the Minister of Transport, and is specifically re-
sponsible for New Zealand's aviation safety and security.
Whilst the Act does not expressly incorporate any aspect of
the Chicago Convention, the long title to the Act recognises that
one purpose of the legislation is "to ensure that New Zealand's
obligations under international aviation agreements are
implemented."6 8
More particularly, the Minister of Transport is given the spe-
cific function of administering New Zealand's participation in
the Chicago Convention,69 and ensuring that any rules made
under the Act are not inconsistent with standards of the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organisation and New Zealand's interna-
tional aviation obligations.7 ° In addition, the Minister is given
the power to incorporate by reference standards, requirements,
or recommended practices of international aviation
organisations.71
However, whilst the Civil Aviation Act clearly provides the nec-
essary mechanism for the incorporation of New Zealand's obli-
gations under the Annex 13 standard, the Civil Aviation
Authority is unsupportive of the rationale underlying Annex 13.
In this context, aviation safety and aviation prosecutions are
competing objectives, and the objective of aviation prosecution
must be subjugated to the greater public good of enhancing avi-
ation safety and the creation of an environment which will allow
for a systemic analysis of aviation risk.
In fact, the Civil Aviation Authority adamantly adopts the
view, opposed by the international aviation community, that
prosecution will encourage aviation safety, and, for example, has
strongly argued for the retention of broad prosecution privi-
68 Civil Aviation Act of 1990.
69 Id. § 14(2)(a).
70 Id. § 31(1).
71 Id. § 36.
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leges under the Transport Accident Investigation Amendment
Bill.7
2
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter II above, the contention
that prosecutions are integral to the promotion of aviation
safety is belied by the Civil Aviation Authority's own statistics.
The Authority's most recent annual report proclaims that, in
pursuing its objective of aviation safety, a mere four percent of
the Authority's resources are utilised in prosecutions.
The Civil Aviation Authority's reluctance to accept the validity
of the requirements of Annex 13 with respect to the disclosure
and use of aviation safety information means that whilst the stat-
ute which it administers allows the mechanism for incorporation
of New Zealand's international obligations under the Chicago
Convention with respect to the protection of such information,
effective implementation of those obligations under the statute
seems unlikely to occur.
Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990
The Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990
established the Transport Accident Investigation Commission
(TAIC) as an independent Crown entity. The Commission's
functions are, in part, to perform New Zealand's obligations
under the Chicago Convention with respect to aviation accident
investigation. The statute specifically incorporates the rationale
expressed in Annex 13. The Act provides that the principal pur-
pose of the Commission is to perform New Zealand's obligations
under Annex 13 in accordance with the rationale underlying
that Standard. That is, the Commission's primary function is to
determine the circumstances and causes of accidents and inci-
dents primarily to attempt to avoid similar occurrences in the
future, rather than to ascribe blame to any person.73
The Act provides the Commission with extensive powers to
enable it to perform its functions. For example, the Commis-
sion has the power to seize and retain any material that it be-
lieves, on reasonable grounds, will assist in establishing the
cause of an accident or incident.7 1 Such material cannot then
72 See the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand's submission to the Trans-
port and Environment Select Committee on the Transport Accident Investiga-
tion Amendment Bill.
73 Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act § 4 (1990).
74 Id. § 12(1) (b). For example, the aircraft operator or owner would own the
cockpit voice recorder at all times, but after an accident, the Commission's power
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be accessed or examined by any other person or entity without
the Commission's consent.7 5
By contrast with the Civil Aviation Authority, the Commission
is fully supportive of the rationale underlying Annex 13 that, in
this context, aviation safety and aviation prosecutions are com-
peting objectives, and that the objective of aviation prosecution
must be subjugated to the greater public good of enhancing avi-
ation safety and the creation of an environment which will allow
for a systemic analysis of aviation risk.
Accordingly, the Commission has a strict policy of refusing to
disclose aviation safety information for any purpose other than
the promotion of aviation safety, and has gone to court on a
number of occasions to seek to enforce this policy.
In fact, the Commission is so concerned with enforcing New
Zealand's international obligations to ensure appropriate access
to aviation safety information, and to address aviation safety
rather than culpability, that it has been publicly criticised for
being overly concerned with attempting to avoid assigning
blame.76
The extensive powers afforded to the Commission under the
Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act, and the
Commission's approach to the exercise of those powers, provide
the mechanism to allow the Commission to effectively imple-
ment New Zealand's obligations under the Chicago Convention
with respect to aviation accident investigation and to protect rel-
evant aviation safety information. But judicial inroads in this
area undermine the Commission's attempts to maintain the in-
tegrity of the aviation accident investigation process, and, corre-
spondingly, the effective implementation of New Zealand's
obligations under the Chicago Convention.
B. GENERIC LEGISLATION
Official Information Act 1982
The purpose underlying the Official Information Act is to in-
crease the availability of official information to promote effec-
tive public participation in law and policy development and
to seize the cockpit voice recorder gives it exclusive rights of possession and con-
trol until the investigation is complete.
75 Id. § 14.
76 See Bill Guest, Secretive Accident Investigation Process Hampers Justice, THE INDE-
PENDENT, July 7, 1999.
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administration, and to promote executive and bureaucratic
accountability.
The policy underlying the Official Information Act, as ex-
pressed in the long title to the Act, is to promote the availability
of official information.7 Any information which comes into the
possession of any government-owned entity in any form, includ-
ing, for example, oral advice, is essentially deemed to be official
information, regardless of the wishes of the proprietor of such
information, the purposes for which such information was ac-
quired, or the function of that organisation. Accordingly, all avi-
ation safety information which comes into the possession of any
of the organisations fulfilling aviation safety functions in New
Zealand, including the Transport Accident Investigation Com-
mission and the Civil Aviation Authority, as. discussed above,
plus Airways Corporation of New Zealand Limited, a commer-
cial company responsible for the operation of New Zealand's air
navigation systems, but currently retaining the government as its
shareholder, would be considered official information for the
purposes of the Act.7"
The Official Information Act would generally require any avi-
ation safety information acquired by such organisations to be
made publicly available on demand to any third party. As the
principle underlying the Act is to promote the availability of offi-
cial information, there are extremely limited grounds available
under the Act for withholding such information. 79  Further-
more, even if it is established that one or more of the grounds
for withholding such information apply, such information must
nevertheless be made publicly available if the public interest in
disclosure is considered to override those reasons.80
77 The Official Information Act 1982 provides as follows:
An Act to make official information more freely available, to pro-
vide for proper access by each person to official information relat-
ing to that person, to protect official information to the extent
consistent with the public interest and the preservation of personal
privacy, to establish procedures for the achievement of those pur-
poses, and to repeal the Official Secrets Act 1951.
78 All of these organisations are currently owned by the New Zealand govern-
ment. Whilst Airways Corporation is a limited company, its shareholder is cur-
rently the New Zealand Government.
79 See Official Information Act § 5 (1982).
80 See id. § 9(1). Note that the public interest is taken to mean being of legiti-
mate concern to the public, as opposed to matters which are merely interesting
to the public. See Sir Brian Edward & Anand Satyanand, The Ombudsmen's Role in
Investigating and reviewing Decisions to Withhold Official Information, OMBUDSMEN Q.
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If New Zealand's international obligations under Annex 13 to
the Chicago Convention were expressly incorporated into do-
mestic law, then the Official Information Act would correspond-
ingly protect against the disclosure of such information.
However, until this occurs,"1 New Zealand's international obliga-
tions cannot generally be relied upon to resist disclosure under
the Act.8 2
Whilst the limited grounds under the Act have been success-
fully relied upon by Airways Corporation of New Zealand to de-
cline to provide access to air traffic control tapes on the grounds
of New Zealand's international obligations and employment
contract obligations with respect to the use of such information,
effectively applying public interest immunity on a class basis to
such information," more recent judicial decisions in this area
suggest that aviation safety information is unlikely to be gener-
ally protected from disclosure under the Official Information
Act.
8 4
Furthermore, regardless of whether the Official Information
Act is applied generally to protect aviation safety information
from disclosure, this will provide little real protection for avia-
tion safety information against disclosure and use for
prosecutory purposes. Grounds for withholding information
under the Act clearly cannot be applied to resist seizure of infor-
mation under a search warrant.
Privacy Act 1993
The policy underlying the Privacy Act 1993 is to protect the
privacy of natural persons.
It appears generally accepted that privacy rights attach to indi-
viduals recorded on, at least, certain aviation safety information,
for example, cockpit voice records.8 5 However, whether privacy
REv., June 1999, available at http://www.ombudsmen.govt.nz (last visited June 1,
2003).
81 However, this position may now have changed subsequent to the enactment
of the Transport Accident Investigation Commission Amendment Act 1999. See
infta Ch. VII.
82 Official Information Act § 18(c) (i) provides grounds for refusing to disclose
official information on the basis that "the making available of the information
requested would be contrary to the provisions of a specified enactment." Official
Information Act § 18(c) (i) (1982).
83 Id. § 9(2)(ba)(i).
84 For example, common law protections against disclosure are similarly un-
likely to apply. See supra Ch. III.
85 See The Mount Erebus Inquiries, supra Ch. III.
366
AVIATION SAiETY IN NEW ZEALA3D
rights attach more generally to communications, part of which
may already be in the public domain, for example air traffic con-
trol records, 6 is more controversial.
In general terms, the Privacy Act requires that persons whose
privacy may be affected by the public release of information be
given the right of access to and correction of such information,
and the right to veto the disclosure and use of such information.
In the context of aviation safety information, this would mean
that, for example, flight crew should be able to prevent the dis-
closure and use of cockpit voice records for purposes opposed
to aviation safety. However, there are a number of limitations
on such privacy rights which mean that the Privacy Act is un-
likely to provide a generally effective tool against the disclosure
and use of aviation safety information.
First, privacy rights attach solely to individuals and are not
generally considered to be transferable or assignable. Conse-
quently, where, as in many aviation accidents, those relevant in-
dividuals are deceased, any privacy rights will correspondingly
be extinguished.
Second, the right to prevent the disclosure or use of informa-
tion cannot be used where that disclosure or use relates to one
of the reasons for which the information was originally
obtained."'
Accordingly, it is probable that privacy rights could not be re-
lied upon to prevent the disclosure or use of aviation safety in-
formation for aviation safety purposes. For example, the
publication of an aviation transcript within a Transport Accident
Investigation Commission investigation report, as that would be
one of the purposes for which the information had been
obtained.88
86 Communications between air traffic control and flight crew are broadcast
on public VHF frequencies.
87 Principle 11 provides:
Limits on disclosure of personal information. An agency that holds per-
sonal information shall not disclose that information to a person or
body or agency unless the agency believes, on reasonable grounds,
that the disclosure of the information is one of the purposes in
connection with which the information was obtained or is directly
related to the purposes in connection with which the information
was obtained ...
Privacy Act § 6, Principle 11 (1993).
88 See, e.g., Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Case Note No. 15972, available
at http://www.privacy.org.nz/people/cnl 5 9 7 2 .htmi (last visited June 1, 2003).
The New Zealand Privacy Commissioner decided that publishing an edited cock-
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Correspondingly, if the underlying rationale of the Chicago
Convention that aviation safety information should not be avail-
able for other purposes continues to be rejected by the New Zea-
land Government and the New Zealand courts, then it is
probable that the Privacy Act will similarly be unavailable to pre-
vent the disclosure or use of aviation safety information for
prosecutory purposes.
Judicature Amendment Act 1972
Judicial review by the courts under the Judicature Amend-
ment Act 1972, or at common law, could potentially be used as a
mechanism to ensure that, in the administration of the legisla-
tion referred to above, or more generally in the exercise of gov-
ernmental decision-making, relevant obligations under Annex
13 to the Chicago Convention are taken into account.
For example, it has been recently suggested that judicial re-
view may be available to require international obligations which
have not been domestically incorporated, nevertheless to be
taken into account by decision-makers.
Recent case law suggests that the courts may be prepared to
hold that certain international obligations are implied
mandatory considerations for decision-makers exercising rele-
vant powers, even though that particular statute is silent on such
matters and the relevant international instruments have not
been incorporated into domestic law.89
However, given the prevailing attitude of the New Zealand
courts and other agencies towards the potential for direct incor-
poration of the obligations under Annex 13 discussed in this
Chapter and Chapter III above, effective recognition of New
Zealand's international obligations via the judicial review pro-
cess is, at least currently, unlikely to occur.
V. POLICY DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRANSPORT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AMENDMENT BILL
This Chapter examines the policy development of the Trans-
port Accident Investigation Amendment Bill. Though two revi-
pit voice recorder transcript of the Dash 8 Palmerston North accident would not
be a breach of the pilots' privacy, as the disclosure of the cockpit voice recorder
information in the Transport Accident Investigation Commission accident report
was one of the purposes for which the information had been obtained.
89 Mary Scholtens, Barrister, Judicial Review, New Zealand Law Society Semi-
nar, Wellington (1999).
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sions of the policy proposal have moved New Zealand closer to
the Chicago Convention's intent of a systemic approach to avia-
tion safety, significant lapses remain.
A. THE FIRST POLICY PROPOSAL
The Ministry of Transport's90 first discussion document on
the use of aviation safety information was published in October
1997.91
The impetus for the discussion document stemmed from the
Ansett Dash 8 accident and ensuing litigation, discussed in
Chapter III above. In particular, the issue of whether a
prosecutory authority should be permitted to seize aviation
safety information by way of search warrant prompted the Trans-
port Accident Investigation Commission to make specific recom-
mendations on these topics in its formal accident investigation
report.92
In that report, the Commission recommended to the Minister
of Transport that the provisions of Annex 13 to the Chicago
Convention relating to the use of aviation safety information
should be expressly incorporated into New Zealand domestic
law to protect from disclosure cockpit voice recorders and other
evidence obtained by the Commission, that retention and use of
cockpit voice recorders should be made mandatory as a matter
of urgency, and that April 1999 should be regarded as a dead-
line for compulsory installation of cockpit voice recorders in
commercial aircraft.
9 3
It is clear from the discussion document that its primary pol-
icy focus was intended to be the implementation of the relevant
international standards contained in the Chicago Convention.
This was purportedly achieved by maintaining the primary pur-
pose of accident and incident investigation records as safety and
educational tools, whilst allowing for the courts to determine on
a case by case basis according to certain criteria whether such a
record would be available for prosecutory purposes.
90 The Ministry of Transport is the government department responsible for
administering New Zealand's civil aviation legislation.
91 Ministry of Transport, Proposal for the Use of Information from Aviation Accident
and Incident Investigation Records, WELLINGTON, Oct. 1997.
92 This report was published in July 1997. See supra Ch. III.
93 Similar sentiments were expressed by the Transport Select Committee dur-
ing its consideration of the Civil Aviation Amendment Bill 1996. In its report, the
Committee considered that primary legislation giving effect to Annex 13 was
needed with regard to the use of aviation safety information.
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In so doing, the first discussion document ignored the gener-
ally held view of the international aviation community that
whenever information recorded for safety purposes may be po-
tentially disclosed and used for other purposes, it will have some
adverse effect on safety as it will prejudice the continuous flow
of such essential safety information in the future.
The discussion document similarly ignored the rationale un-
derlying Annex 13, which, in this context, is that the public in-
terest in the pursuit of aviation prosecutions is far outweighed
by the public interest in the pursuit of aviation safety, so that the
public interest in prosecution must be subjugated to the greater
public good of safer air transportation.
In failing to recognise and address this fundamental issue, the
policy development underlying the Bill has failed effectively to
address New Zealand's international obligations under Annex
13, and similarly has-failed to create an environment supportive
of an effective systemic analysis of aviation risk.
By contrast, if the initial policy consideration of these issues
led the New Zealand government to the conclusion, opposed by
the majority of international safety experts, that there is, in fact,
a point at which the conflicting interests of aviation safety and
aviation prosecutions can be reconciled, without compromising
the objective of aviation safety, a convincing alternative should
be given. That is, the point at which the objective of aviation
safety can be reconciled with the objective of aviation prosecu-
tions, should be clearly identified.
However, rather than doing so, the first discussion document
abrogated responsibility for such a determination to the judici-
ary, requiring the courts to decide on a case by case basis,
guided only by certain vague and imprecise criteria,94 whether
an aviation safety record could also be used for prosecutory
purposes. 5
Moreover, whilst aviation safety information could only be
made available for serious criminal offences (such as murder,
manslaughter or specific aviation crimes, such as hijacking), no
limitations were contained for the severity of the offence in civil
proceedings, potentially allowing aviation safety records to be
obtained for any minor civil offence.96 Furthermore, the first
proposal would clearly fail to address the primary issue leading
94 Ministry of Transport, supra note 91, at 8, para. c.
95 Id. at Foreword.
96 Id. at 7, para. (b)(i).
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to the necessity for the Transport Accident Investigation
Amendment Bill, as it expressly stated that it would not prevent
the police from obtaining access to accident records by search
warrant.
97
Despite the claim to the contrary,98 it is clear that the first
discussion document would not have effectively implemented
New Zealand's obligations under Annex 13, nor provided ap-
propriate protections for aviation safety information. After con-
sidering submissions on the original proposal, the Ministry of
Transport published a revised proposal in February 1998, which
provides the framework for the current Bill.
B. THE REVISED PROPOSAL
Whilst the revised proposal moved further towards adopting
the view of the international aviation community, it failed to ef-
fectively expand protections for aviation safety information in
the far more significant area of potential criminal proceedings.
The original proposal clearly considered that a broad approach
to the definition of aviation safety information was necessary to
achieve the objective of enhanced aviation safety. The revised
proposal adopted a far more limited interpretation of aviation
safety information, with no explanation therefor. The first dis-
cussion document expressly considered information protection
issues relating to cockpit voice recorders and air traffic control
records as analogous, such that similar protections should be
afforded to both categories of records: "Under the proposal,
certain air traffic control records are protected because their
disclosure could jeopardise the future supply of that informa-
tion to accident and incident investigations, in the same way as
disclosure of cockpit voice recorder and other records. . .
However, air traffic control records are, with no explanation,
omitted from the definition of aviation safety records in the re-
vised proposal.
Similarly, the second proposal failed to address the main issue
resulting from the Dash 8 accident and recommended to be ad-
dressed by the Transport Accident Investigation Commission ac-
cident report, as it also would not prevent the police from
obtaining access to accident records by search warrant.'0 0
97 Id. at 7, para. (a).
98 Id. at 1.
- Id. at 10.
100 See id. at 7, para. (a).
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After reviewing submissions on the revised proposal, the resul-
tant draft legislation, the Transport Accident Investigation Com-
mission Amendment Bill, was published.
VI. THE PROVISIONS OF THE TRANSPORT ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION AMENDMENT BILL
The Transport Accident Investigation Amendment Bill en-
deavours to achieve its purpose of implementing the require-
ments of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention by introducing
specific restrictions on the disclosure and admissibility of avia-
tion safety records. But rather than extending comprehensive
protections to all aviation safety records, the Bill divides such
records into two categories: those that are given absolute protec-
tion from disclosure and admissibility, 10 1 and those that are only
given qualified protection. 102
Essentially, the Bill draws a fundamental distinction between
records that are generated in the course of a formal accident
investigation after an aviation accident or incident has occurred,
which are given absolute protection against disclosure and ad-
missibility, and records generated prior to any such investiga-
tion, which are only given qualified protections.
As noted above, aviation records given absolute protection are
limited to records generated after an aviation accident or inci-
dent has occurred.'0 3 Such records may only be disclosed for
the purpose of a formal investigation into an aviation accident
or incident to which the particular record relates, and are not
admissible in any proceedings.'0 4
By contrast, aviation records given qualified protection are
generally records generated prior to any formal aviation acci-
dent investigation.1 0 5 Such records can only be disclosed by or-
10, Transport Accident Investigation Amendment Bill, cl. 14B.
102 Id. cl. 14C.
103 More specifically, these records are: any statement or submission made to
an investigator in the course of an investigation; any recording or transcript gen-
erated after an accident or incident in the course of an investigation; any investi-
gator's note or opinion generated after an accident or incident in the course of
an investigation; and any information relating to an investigation that is provided
in confidence by an investigator to another person (unless that information is a
record subject to qualified protection).
104 Proceedings are given an extended definition to cover not only any court
proceedings, but also a coronial inquiry, an arbitration under the Arbitration Act
1996, and a court-martial.
105 More specifically, these records are: communications between the flight
deck and air traffic control or other person involved in the operation of the air-
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der of the High Court in the case of certain defined serious civil
or criminal °6 proceedings.
To prevent a recurrence of the situation arising as a result of
the Court of Appeal's decision in the Ansett case 11 7 and the re-
sulting recommendations of the Transport Accident Investiga-
tion Commission that a prosecutor can seize aviation safety
records by way of search warrant, the Bill provides that no
search warrant may be issued for both records subject to abso-
lute protection, and records subject to qualified protection. 08
Whilst it may be that this provision would be sufficient to reverse
the current common law position,0 9 the provision may be insuf-
ficient to afford appropriate comprehensive protection for such
records, as they may still be subject to disclosure in civil proceed-
ings, for example under a witness summons.
Clearly, the Bill attempts to draw a distinction between
records generated during the course of a formal aviation acci-
dent investigation as inherently requiring greater protections
craft; a cockpit voice recorder or a transcript of it; a cockpit video recording or a
transcript of it; and personal information, that is, information about an identifi-
able person that is generated in the course of an accident investigation.
106 Disclosure of criminal proceedings is available for certain aviation records
on a balance of probabilities test, that is that there are reasonable grounds to
believe an offence has been committed, and the offence cannot be investigated
without that evidence. Transport Accident Investigation Amendment Bill, cl.
14E(4). A disclosure order can be obtained for certain serious offences. These
offences are set out in clause 14E(a)-(d) of the Bill and are as follows: any offence
against the Crimes Act 1961, the Aviation Crimes Act 1972, and the Crimes (In-
ternationally Protected Persons and Hostages) Act 1980 that is punishable by im-
prisonment for a term of 10 years or more; an offence against §§ 190, 296, 297,
300, or 303 of the Crimes Act 1961; an offence against § 11 of the Aviation
Crimes Act 1972; and an offence against the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971.
Note that under § 155 of the Crimes Act 1961, which relates to the duty of per-
sons doing dangerous acts, and § 156, which relates to the duty of persons in
charge of a dangerous thing, pilots are subject to the legal duty to take precau-
tions against danger, and to use reasonable care to avoid danger, when operating
an aircraft. A person may be found guilty of manslaughter if a person dies as a
breach of this duty without lawful excuse. The Justice and Law Reform Select
Committee is at present considering a bill recommending amendments to the
Crimes Act which would impact this legal duty. The Crimes Amendment (No. 5)
Bill seeks to amend the Crimes Act by providing that "a person is criminally re-
sponsible for omitting to discharge or perform a legal duty only if, in the circum-
stances of a particular case, the omission or neglect is a major departure from the
standard of care expected..." If enacted, this amendment will mean that only
the most serious cases of negligence will be the subject of manslaughter charges.
107 See infra Ch. III.
108 Transport Accident Investigation Investigation Bill, cl. 140.
109 Currently, it is unlikely that the common law would protect against com-
pelled disclosure in the context of actual proceedings.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
against disclosure and admissibility than other types of aviation
records.
It is presumed that the Bill draws such an arbitrary distinction
in an attempt to reconcile New Zealand's obligations under the
Chicago Convention to restrict the use of aviation safety records
to aviation safety purposes with the competing objective of per-
mitting the use of aviation safety information for prosecutory
purposes.
In so doing, New Zealand has again apparently disregarded
the commonly accepted views of the international aviation com-
munity that the interests of aviation safety and aviation prosecu-
tion cannot be easily reconciled. Accordingly, as the public
interest in aviation safety outweighs the public interest in avia-
tion prosecutions, the objective of aviation prosecution must be
subjected to the greater public good of safer air transport and
the creation of an environment conducive to the application of
a systemic analysis to aviation risk.
In attempting to implement New Zealand's obligations under
the Chicago Convention and achieve the objective of aviation
safety, the Bill makes the assumption that records generated
during an aviation accident investigation are considered to be
more integral to the promotion of aviation safety than other
types of aviation records, which may or may not subsequently be
required for such an investigation.
Such an assumption is misguided. The most effective means
of enhancing aviation safety requires a systemic analysis of avia-
tion risk. A comprehensive approach to such systemic analysis
necessitates the protection of all aviation information recorded
for safety purposes, in order to identify all of the factors relevant
to the risk of an aviation accident, regardless of whether such
information may subsequently be required for a formal accident
investigation. 10
In particular, a systemic approach to aviation safety recognises
the primary importance of analysing and addressing latent fail-
l10 The Bill also adopts a much narrower definition of aviation safety records
than either that adopted in the policy development stage of the Bill or set out in
Annex 13. For example, a restrictive interpretation of air traffic control records
covered by the Bill is adopted. Annex 13 requires that, in relation to air traffic
control, protections be extended to "[a]ll communications between persons hav-
ing been involved in the operation of the aircraft." Annex 13, supra note 13,
§ 5.12(b). This is generally interpreted to mean that protections should extend
to all communications between air traffic controllers, as well as communications
between air traffic control and aircraft.
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ures. That is, those embedded risks relating to human or or-
ganisational factors which, if undetected and unaddressed,
create an environment in which a major accident may occur.
Such latent failures can be earliest identified by an effective ex-
amination of the more frequent, but less serious, aviation inci-
dents, which may never form part of a formal accident
investigation. The effective identification of such latent failures
will minimise the potential for systemic failure to manifest in a
major air catastrophe, which would then become the subject of
a formal aviation accident investigation."'
Consequently, comprehensive protections for aviation records
generated prior to any formal aviation accident investigation are
at least as fundamental to the effective promotion of systemic
aviation safety as comprehensive protections for records gener-
ated during such investigations. 12 In failing to recognise this,
the Bill prejudices the primary objective enshrined in Annex 13
of the Chicago Convention, which is the promotion of systemic
aviation safety.
Similarly, the concept in the Bill of permitting the disclosure
of certain aviation safety records for particular categories of civil
or criminal offences is inherently misconceived. The view taken
by the New Zealand government, and opposed by the interna-
tional aviation community, that, in this context, the fundamen-
tally conflicting objectives of aviation safety and aviation
prosecutions can be reconciled, has resulted in the Bill adopting
a misguided and arbitrary list of so-called serious offences for
which aviation safety information can be made available. If the
New Zealand government, in implementing its obligations
under the Chicago Convention, has made the policy determina-
tion that there is a point at which the conflicting interests of
aviation safety and aviation prosecutions can be reconciled, that
point should be clearly identified in the legislation.
Rather than bear the potential political cost of engaging in
such contentious decision-making, in a classic manifestation of
I Clause 2 of the Bill defines an investigation as an investigation under either
§ 13 of the Civil Aviation Act 1990, which is carried out by TAIC, or § 72B(2) (d)
of the Civil Aviation Act 1990, which is carried out by the CAA. Section
72B(2) (d) investigations are not limited to safety investigations. However, clause
2 of the Bill limits the definition of investigation to § 72B investigations that are
carried out for safety purposes.
112 This is inherently recognised in the Chicago Convention, which does not
draw any distinction between protections for pre and post investigation records.
See Chicago Convention, supra note 1.
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public choice theory,' 13 the government has chosen to abrogate
its responsibility for such policy determination to the judici-
ary.114 In doing so, the Bill places a constitutionally inappropri-
ate expectation on the judiciary to exercise policy decisions
about the disclosure and use of aviation safety information
which should more appropriately be made by Parliament.
As evidenced below, the courts' task is further complicated by
the ambiguity and illogicality of the disclosure parameters as are
adopted by the Bill, and by the potential for easy manipulation
of such criteria on the part of prosecution agencies, that could
simply assume when gathering evidence that a relevant serious
offence has occurred. For example, disclosure for civil proceed-
ings is available for certain aviation records where the level of
damages claimed exceeds the current district court limit. How-
ever, the adoption of this arbitrary limit is not explained, and
can be easily circumvented by inflating the damages claim by
adding a claim for general damages for distress and inconve-
nience sufficient to take the total claim beyond the district court
limit.
Further, the Bill's test for disclosure does not allow the court
to weigh the public interest in an individual aviation prosecu-
tion against the public interest not just in that particular infor-
mation, but more importantly, in the future availability of
aviation safety information.
The courts task is further complicated by the fact that there is
no definition of disclosure,' 1 5 and the Bill does not specify all
the circumstances in which disclosure is available, or the circum-
stances in which further disclosure of a disclosed record would
be permitted." 6
The uncertainty created by the above factors will further un-
dermine the potential effectiveness and efficiency of the pro-
113 In simple terms, public choice is the application of economics to political
science. See generally Farber & Frickey, supra note 9, at 878.
114 Although, in public choice terms, this would actually be the rational deci-
sion for the government to make, rather than prejudice its chances of being re-
elected by being perceived to make unpopular policy decisions.
115 It is unclear whether it is confined to disclosure of an original document, or
extends, for example, to an oral disclosure of some or all of the contents of the
record other than in accordance with cls. 14B(3) or 14C(5). In addition, a cur-
rent reference to protected aviation records in judgments and coroners' findings
could constitute disclosure.
116 Clauses 14B(1) (a) and 14C(1) (a) allow a record to be disclosed by an inves-
tigator or other person for the purposes of the investigation into the accident or
incident to which the record relates.
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posed legislation by unjustifiably increasing agency costs as a
result of policy decisions having to be exercised by the courts on
an individual basis, rather than having statutory guidelines of
general application." i7 For example, in the Australian National
Airlines case, discussed in Chapter VIII below, it was recorded
that arguments on disclosure and admissibility occupied one
and a half days.
The Bill has failed to effectively create an environment sup-
portive of a comprehensive systemic approach to aviation safety.
Despite the primary objective to implement New Zealand's in-
ternational obligations under Annex 13 to the Chicago Conven-
tion, the underlying assumptions are that the conflicting
objectives of aviation safety and aviation prosecutions can easily
be reconciled by the courts and that only certain types of avia-
tion safety records are integral to the promotion of aviation
safety. This fundamentally compromises the objective of avia-
tion safety.
VII. THE TRANSPORT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
COMMISSION ACT
The Transport Accident Investigation Amendment Bill passed
into law in early September 1999 as the Transport Accident In-
vestigation Commission Amendment Act.
The Act contains a number of significant departures from the
original Bill. Those amendments are the result of recommenda-
tions of the Transport and Environment Select Committee fol-
lowing its consideration of the Bill.
The Select Committee identified the central issue for its con-
sideration as being whether aviation safety would be best served
by a regulatory regime which encourages the use of cockpit
voice recorders and similar devices for safety investigative pur-
poses only, or by providing for possible disclosure in criminal
proceedings against flight crew."'
In a radical departure from the provisions of the original Bill,
the Select Committee came to the view that cockpit voice re-
corders should not be available at all for disclosure or use
"7 Under the Bill this will occur, at least in the short term, until general prece-
dents become established. Moreover, as clause 14L of the Bill preserves all other
grounds of inadmissibility, those same arguments may then be relitigated in the
context of a challenge to admissibility on the grounds of public interest immunity
and then again in any future case.
11 This mirrors the approach adopted in Canada and Australia.
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against flight crew in either criminal or civil proceedings. In so
doing, the Select Committee clearly accepts the proposition set
out in this paper, at least in relation to cockpit voice records,
that the public good of enhancing aviation safety outweighs the
interest in making aviation information recorded for safety pur-
poses available for a prosecution.
In fact, in recognising the fundamental importance of the
need to maintain free and frank communications between avia-
tion professionals, the Select Committee took the view that the
Civil Aviation Authority should not be permitted access to such
aviation safety records, even for safety investigations, because
the Authority also has a separate prosecutory role, which could
potentially prejudice the continued supply of aviation safety
information.
The Select Committee's comprehensive approach to protect-
ing cockpit voice recorder information is a far better approach
to the implementation of New Zealand's obligations under An-
nex 13 than that previously adopted in the Transport Accident
Investigation Amendment Bill. Unfortunately, such a compre-
hensive approach is not adopted for other aviation safety infor-
mation, such as air traffic control records.
Inconsistently, the Select Committee adopted the view that
aviation safety would be better served by allowing prosecutory
authorities access to such records for the purpose of bringing
enforcement actions. This is difficult to reconcile with the senti-
ments expressed by the Select Committee relating to the protec-
tion of cockpit voice recorder information, and is inconsistent
with the original policy approach to the legislation which
recognised that disclosure issues relating to cockpit voice
records and air traffic control records were analogous.
The Select Committee adopted the view that omitting protec-
tions for air traffic control records would preserve the legal sta-
tus quo in relation to the protection of such records. Given that
specific protections for air traffic control records have now been
expressly rejected by Parliament, it is probable that any attempts
to protect such records against disclosure and use for
prosecutory purposes are less likely to succeed." 9
Accordingly, whilst the Transport Accident Investigation
Commission Act 1999 represents a significant improvement to-
wards the policy objective of implementing New Zealand's obli-
119 Previously, the Official Information Act 1982 had been successfully used to
protect air traffic control records from such disclosure. See supra Ch. IV.
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gations under Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, the limited
scope of aviation safety information adopted by the Act fails to
create an environment supportive of a comprehensive systemic
approach to aviation safety, thereby still compromising the ob-
jective of aviation safety.
VIII. THE COMPARATIVE DIMENSION-
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE
In many countries which are party to the Convention, specific
legislation regulating the extent to which aviation safety infor-
mation may be disclosed and used for other purposes has ex-
isted for a number of years. Whilst there is no uniformity of
approach to the implementation of each State's obligations
under Annex 13, most leading commonwealth aviation coun-
tries provide some degree of legislative protection against the
inappropriate disclosure and use of aviation safety records.
In particular, Australia and Canada provide comprehensive
protections against both disclosure and use of aviation safety in-
formation in criminal and civil proceedings. The protections af-
forded to aviation safety information in Australia and Canada,
plus those afforded in the United Kingdom, Europe, and Scan-
dinavia, are examined below.
AUSTRALIA
The most significant case in Australia examining the protec-
tions afforded to aviation safety information is the Australian Na-
tional Airlines case, 120 which bears a close resemblance to the
issues raised in the Ansett Dash 8 accident. In this case, an Aus-
tralian National Airlines aircraft and a Canadian Pacific Airlines
aircraft collided on a runway. As in the Ansett Dash 8 accident,
access was subsequently sought to the cockpit voice records of
the aircraft for prosecutory purposes. Despite representations
from both the Assistant Secretary of Civil Aviation and the Minis-
ter of Transport that it would be contrary to the public interest
to disclose such aviation safety records, the Australian High
Court 12 1 flatly rejected such arguments and concluded that the
public interest would be better served by allowing rather than
refusing inspection of the cockpit voice recorder tape. In so do-
ing, the Australian High Court similarly expressly precluded the
120 Australian Nat'l Airlines Comm'n v. Commonwealth, (1975) 132 C.L.R.
582.
121 Sitting as a first instance court.
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application of either class and/or contents public interest im-
munity to such information, stating that such a defence would
only be available in exceptional cases, which were very unlikely
to apply in the case of aviation safety information. The Court
stated:
. ..Crown privilege... embrac[es] a group of "exceptional cases"
in which the public interest in the proper administration ofjus-
tice has been outweighed by a superior public interest of a self-
evident and overwhelming kind...
The CVR [cockpit voice recorder] tape does not fall within the
first category of documents attracting Crown privilege. Its con-
tents have no intrinsic importance to the working of govern-
ment, national defence or foreign relations. No harm will ensue
to the nation if the citizenry becomes aware of what Captain
James said as TJA careered down the runway on 19 January
1971. Nor does the tape fall within the second category of docu-
ments privileged from production. 22
The Australians subsequently implemented legislation which
became part of the Australian Air Navigation Act 1920, specifi-
cally incorporating the relevant provisions of the Chicago Con-
vention into Australian law.1 23  This legislation provides
comprehensive protections against both disclosure and use of
certain aviation safety information in criminal and civil proceed-
ings. More specifically, the statute states that a cockpit voice re-
cording made during the flight of an aircraft operated by an
Australian operator is not admissible in any criminal or civil pro-
ceedings against a crew member. 124 In addition, disciplinary
proceedings cannot be brought against an employee on the ba-
sis of any information in a cockpit voice recording or transcript.
CANADA
Canada has recently enacted legislation analogous to that in
Australia, which similarly provides comprehensive protections
against both disclosure and use of cockpit voice records against
flight crew in criminal, civil, or disciplinary proceedings. No
.122 Australian Nat'l Airlines, 132 C.L.R. at 584.
123 Australian Air Navigation Act § 19HA-HL (1920).
124 The inadmissibility of cockpit voice recordings in an Australian Court is
limited by § 19HE to "recordings made during the flight by an aircraft of an
Australian operator." Id. § 19E.
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person can be compelled to give evidence with respect to a cock-
pit voice record in any court proceeding. 1
2 5
.
Prior to this, all flight deck recordings were considered to be
privileged under the common law, could not be used in any
criminal proceedings, and could only be used in civil proceed-
ings if a court determined that the public interest in the proper
administration of justice outweighed the privilege attached to
the cockpit voice record.
In addition, specific legislation exists to protect other aviation
safety records, for example, air traffic control records, from
disclosure. 12
6
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
In the United States, a cockpit voice record or transcript
1 2 v
which was not previously disclosed in the formal accident inves-
tigation report may only be disclosed in court proceedings if the
court determines that such disclosure is necessary for a party to
obtain a fair trial. If disclosure is ordered, the court will also
issue a protective order limiting the use of the recording or tran-
script to those specific proceedings.
1 28
UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom has recently passed legislation which
provides that a cockpit voice record or transcript which has not
been previously disclosed in the formal accident investigation
report may not be disclosed for purposes other than accident or
incident investigation, unless a court is satisfied that the inter-
ests of justice outweigh the adverse domestic and international
impact that disclosure may have on that or any further accident
investigation.1 29
EUROPE AND SCANDINAVIA
In France, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, there is no legislation
specifically preventing the use of aviation safety information in
125 Transportation Safety Board Act § 28 (1989).
126 Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act § 29 (1989).
127 The transcript may only be disclosed for that purpose if the original record-
ing is not available.
128 49 U.S.C. § 1154 (2002).
129 Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations
(1996) SI 2798/18.
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judicial proceedings, although in Denmark a court order to al-
low the disclosure and use of such information would be
required.
Clearly, a number of countries have had specific legislation
governing the issue of protection of aviation safety record for a
number of years, and both Australia and Canada have imple-
mented comprehensive protections for such information.
Whilst many of these countries clearly have not specifically im-
plemented the relevant provisions of Annex 13, New Zealand
has made the policy decision to implement its obligations under
Annex 13 with respect to the protection of aviation safety infor-
mation. It should faithfully reflect the purposes and provisions
of the Chicago Convention in so doing, and accordingly, pro-
vide comprehensive protections for aviation safety information.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined New Zealand's implementation of
its international obligations under Annex 13 of the Interna-
tional Convention on International Civil Aviation in relation to
the protection of aviation safety information and the provisions
of the Transport Accident Investigation Amendment Bill, and
more recently, the Transport Accident Investigation Commis-
sion Amendment Act 1999, intended to implement those obliga-
tions, and argues that to date, New Zealand has failed to
effectively implement its international obligations, or to com-
prehensively promote aviation safety.
The effective promotion of aviation safety, which is the objec-
tive underlying Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention, requires
the application of systemic analysis to identify all of the factors
contributing to the risk of an aviation incident or accident. The
revelation of these factors is only to be used to promote aviation
safety, however. Though the information acquired in a systemic
analysis of an accident may be relevant to the prosecution of
individuals associated with that accident, public policy and the
intent of Annex 13 weigh against such disclosure. The greater
public good of safer air transport subjugates the narrow pursuit
of individual legal liability.
However, this paper demonstrates that, both at common law
and legislatively, New Zealand has consistently been unwilling to
recognise and implement its obligations under Annex 13, and
correspondingly unwilling to recognise the necessity for afford-
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ing comprehensive protections for aviation safety information
against disclosure and use for other purposes.
Most recently, in the Ansett Dash 8 case, the New Zealand
Court of Appeal rejected any direct applicability for the provi-
sions of Annex 13 itself and was also unwilling to entertain the
notion that protections for aviation safety information might be
available under the common law, for example, by virtue of the
common law principles of class or contents public interest
immunity.
Whilst some existing domestic legislation provides the neces-
sary mechanism for the incorporation of New Zealand's obliga-
tions under Annex 13, the prevailing domestic attitude towards
the protection of aviation safety information means that effec-
tive implementation of New Zealand's international obligations
via such legislation is unlikely to occur.
Similarly, whilst the provisions of the Transport Accident In-
vestigation Bill are intended to implement New Zealand's obli-
gations under the Chicago Convention with respect to the
protection of aviation safety records, New Zealand's-failure fully
to support the underlying rationale of Annex 13, that the con-
flicting objectives of aviation safety and aviation prosecution
cannot be reconciled, means that the necessary protections for
aviation safety information have not been achieved.
Whilst the recently enacted Transport Accident Investigation
Commission Amendment Act 1999 represents a significant im-
provement towards the implementation of New Zealand's obli-
gations under Annex 13, the limited scope of aviation safety
information adopted by the Act fails to create an environment
supportive of a comprehensive systemic approach to aviation
safety.
To conclude, in this paper it is submitted that New Zealand
has failed, both legislatively and at common law, to effectively
implement its international obligations under the Chicago Con-
vention on International Civil Aviation in relation to the protec-
tion of aviation safety information. Furthermore, despite the
recommendations of the Mahon report into the Mount Erebus
tragedy, and the current Minister of Transport recently publicly
proclaiming the desirability of such an approach,° in failing to
adequately protect aviation safety information, New Zealand has
thus far failed to create an environment which will allow for an
130 Hon. Maurice Williamson, Minister of Transport, Speech to the Aviation
Industry Association Conference, Dunedin (July 30, 1999).
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effective systemic analysis to the issue of aviation risk. In so do-
ing, the fundamental objective of aviation safety has been com-
promised to the detriment of us all.
